Introduction
Current debates about policy reform in LDCs generally focus on improving the delivery of social services, the design of market-friendly economic institutions, the effectiveness of poverty reduction programmes, or the role of trade and market liberalization, and very rarely deal explicitly with tax reform and the need to develop modern income tax systems in those countries. 1 This is unfortunate for at least three reasons. First, poor countries tend to rely excessively on highly distortionary tax instruments such as taxes on trade or indirect taxes on specific consumption goods. The gradual shift towards modern and transparent income and payroll tax systems is generally regarded as an important, efficiency-enhancing aspect of the modernization process.
Next, many LDCs need to raise more tax revenues in order to properly finance education and health investment, and income taxation can be part of the solution, especially in an international context characterized by sharp downward pressures on tariffs and various indirect taxes. In countries like China and India, in spite of very rapid growth, tax revenues are currently stagnating around 10%-15% of GDP, which is probably far too little. There is no example of a country in the West that has been able to develop a proper education and health system with total tax revenues around 10-15% of GDP. Improving the efficiency of social services delivery is probably a good idea, but might well be illusory in case those services are not properly funded.
Finally, many LDCs have witnessed a sharp rise in income inequality during the recent period. Progressive taxation is probably one of the least distortionary policy tools available to keep the rise in inequality under control and to redistribute a bit more equally the gains from growth (it is less distortionary than more radical policy tools such as nationalization, minimum wages or autarky). In India, the fact that many people did not benefit from the 5%-6% annual growth rates advertised by the government and felt left behind of "shining India" probably played an important role in recent electoral outcomes.
In this paper, we choose to focus on the case of progressive income taxation in China. Although a progressive individual income tax system has been in place in China since 1980, it has received very little attention so far, probably because the 1 See, e.g., the list of topics covered in World Development Reports over the past few years.
fraction of the population with income above the exemption threshold was negligible until the 1990s (less than 1%). Using annual, 1986 Using annual, -2003 tabulations from urban household income surveys collected by China's National Statistical Bureau (NSB), we compute series on levels and shares of top incomes in China over this period, as well as series on theoretical numbers of taxpayers and total income tax receipts (based on actual tax law). 2 We also make projections about the evolution of the number of taxpayers and total receipts over the 2004-2015 period, assuming constant income trends and income tax schedules.
One additional motivation for computing theoretical numbers of taxpayers and tax receipts is the fact that there is widespread presumption that official Chinese income tax law is not being applied very rigorously by tax authorities. In particular, many observers seem to believe that tax authorities make deals with large firms and autonomous regions or cities whereby the latter offer a lump-sum payment to tax authorities and their employees and residents are not subject to the official income tax schedule. Although at this stage there does not seem to exist detailed tabulations of income tax returns by income brackets or tax liability in China (such tabulations exist in most countries with an income tax system), we were able to use aggregate 1996-2003 income tax receipts series (broken down by wage income, business income and capital income for [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] and compare them with our theoretical series. It turns out that although there is some evidence that the law is not fully applied, actual receipts and theoretical receipts are reasonably close.
We were also able to compare our Chinese findings with similar series for India.
Contrarily to its Chinese counterpart, the Indian tax administration has been compiling detailed tabulations of income tax returns every year since the creation of a progressive income tax in India (1922) . Indian tax returns tabulations were recently exploited by Piketty (2004, 2005) to study the long run evolution of top income shares in India, and we use their results for the 1986-2001 sub-period as a comparison point for our Chinese series.
2 A number of economists have used NBS's household surveys and have documented the rise in income inequality that took place in China during the 1990s (see e.g. Chen and Wang (2001) , Eckaus, Lester and Qian (2003) and Ravallion and Chen (2001) ). However these works generally focus on poverty: they generally do not deal specifically with the top of the distribution and (most importantly) do not look at the issue of progressive income taxation. Chen and Wang (2001) show that income dispersion has increased at the top of the distribution (which is fully consistent with our findings) but do not mention the issue of income taxation. For more details on the NSB tabulations used in this study (these tabulations were designed explicitly to focus on top income brackets and to facilitate tax simulations), see section 2 below.
Our main conclusions are the following. First, our general conclusion is that progressive income taxation is about to become an important economic and political object in China and India, and that income tax reform should rank high on the policy agenda in these two countries. Due to high average income growth and sharply rising top income shares during the 1990s and early 2000s, progressive income taxation is starting to hit non-negligible fraction of the population in both countries (as more and more workers pass the exemption threshold, following what happened in Western countries half-a-century ago) and to raise non-trivial tax revenues. According to our projections, the income tax should raise at least 4% of Chinese GDP in 2010 (versus less than 1% in 2000 and 0,1% in 1990) , in spite of the 20% nominal rise in the exemption threshold that took effect in 2004. In case no further rise in exemption threshold occurs (which seems fairly unlikely), we predict that over 80% of urban wage earners will be subject to tax by 2015, and that income tax revenues will well exceed 10% of Chinese GDP (i.e. more than in a number of developed countries).
The fact that progressive income taxation is becoming an important policy tool has important consequences for China's ability to finance social spending and to keep under control the rise in income inequality associated to globalization and growth.
Due to faster income growth, to lower bracket indexation and to a higher fraction of wage earners in the labor force, the prospects for income tax development look better in China than in India. This potential is however limited by the fact that Chinese top wage-earners are under-taxed relatively to top non-wage income earners.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the NSB data used in this paper. In Section 3, we present our findings for the evolution of top income shares in China, and compare them to the Indian series of Banerjee and Piketty (2003) . The results of our income tax simulations are presented and analyzed in section 4. Section 5 offers some concluding comments.
Data and Methodology
The Chinese data used in this paper comes from the urban household income surveys collected by China's National Statistical Bureau (NSB). These surveys are designed so as to representative of urban China. properly attributed to a specific individual within the household (this is particularly true for transfer income and capital income), so that the total income aggregates reported in household tabulations are larger than in individual tabulations, and various adjustments are necessary when one uses the latter (see appendix Tables A1 and   A2 ). However the important advantage of individual tabulations is that China's income tax applies to individual income (rather than household income).
We used standard Pareto interpolation techniques to approximate the form of the Chinese household and individual distribution of income, and we then used these structural parameters to compute top fractiles incomes and to make income tax simulations. 5 The Chinese data appears to be very well approximated by a Pareto distribution (for any given year, Pareto coefficients are extremely stable within the top decile), although there is some presumption that top incomes are underestimated in the survey data (more on this below).
The micro-files for urban household surveys are available for researchers for years 1988 and 1995 only (see Eckaus, Lester and Qian (2003) ). 4 We also asked for "age tabulations" (reporting for each age cell the relevant number of individuals, their average years of education and income, as well as their average income broken down by income sources).We did not use these tables in the current version of this paper. 5 For recent use of Pareto interpolation techniques, see e.g. Piketty (2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) . 6 The Pareto coefficients, as defined by the ratio between average income above a given threshold and the threshold (the definition of a Pareto distribution is that this ratio does not depend on the threshold), appear to be extremely low in China (around 1,2 in the late 1980s, up to around 1,4 in the late 1990s and early 2000s), much lower than in any country for which we have seen similar data. In
We did not attempt to use similar tabulations from rural household surveys, but given that our focus is on top incomes and progressive income taxation this should not be too much of a problem: average rural income was in 2001 more than 3 times smaller than average urban income, 7 so that there are probably very few rural households and individuals in the national top decile, and even less so within the top incomes subject to progressive income taxation (agricultural income is exempt from the income tax and is being taxed separately).
We did not use any new Indian data in this research. All our series regarding India are borrowed from Banerjee and Piketty (2003) , who used Indian income tax returns tabulations published in "All-India Income Tax Statistics" brochures (annually available since 1922) to estimate top income levels and national accounts to compute the average income denominator. Top income shares estimates based upon income tax returns are likely to be higher than estimates based on survey data (as the latter generally underestimates top incomes), but there is no obvious reason why the trends should not be comparable. Note also that the standard household surveys used by economists working on India (NSS surveys) can hardly be used to compute top income shares, as these are mostly expenditure surveys: except for particular years, and contrarily to NSB surveys, NSS surveys contain no systematic information on incomes. 
Top Income Shares in China and India, 1986-2001
Did income inequality in China increase as much as in India during the 1990s?
Before we look at our top income shares series, it is useful to recall one important difference between Chinese and Indian incomes during the past 15 to 20 years.
While real per capita GDP increased by almost 160% in China between 1986 and 2001 (6,4% per year), it increased by slightly more than 60% in India (3,4% per year) (see Figure 1 ). According to the best available PPP conversion factors, real per the 1990s, similarly defined Pareto coefficients are around 1,7-1,8 in France and 2,3-2,4 in the U.S. A higher Pareto coefficient means a fatter upper tail of the distribution (a coefficient equal to 1 means that there is nobody above the given threshold, i.e. the distribution is truncated) and generally implies higher top income shares. 7 See appendix Table A0 . 8 This important difference between China's NSB and India's NSS surveys has probably a lot to do with the fact that the Indian population includes a much higher fraction of independent workers with illdefined income (including in the urban sector) and a much smaller fraction of formal wage-earners than China (more on this below). Figure 2 ). The levels are probably underestimated (during most of the period they are even lower than in the most egalitarian developed countries, e.g. Scandinavia), but the upward trend seems large and robust.
Insert Figure 2 : The top 10% income share in China, 1986 China, -2003 9 See appendix Table A0 . 10 See appendix Table A0 . This "Indian growth paradox" has attracted a lot of attention from economists. Here we use as an end point the latest NSS figures corrected by Deaton (2003) on the basis of the 1999-2000 NSS round (we adjusted upwards this figure to make it comparable to other estimates available for 2001). Deaton's corrections did reduce the size of the gap between national accounts and NSS figures (until these corrections, there was basically no growth at all in the NSS during the 1990s), but the gap is still substantial. Banerjee and Piketty (2003) argue that the gap can be partly explained by the rise in top incomes in India during the 1990s (top incomes are not properly recorded in the NSS). 11 See appendix Table A0 . Note that rural per capita income has increased much less rapidly than urban per capita income and national per capita GDP (both increased at approximately the same rate), but that this was almost exactly compensated by the rise in the urban population share.
As we move up in the income hierarchy, the trend gets even bigger. For instance, the top 1% income share more than doubled between 1986 and 2001, from slightly more than 2,6% in 1986 to 5,9% in 2003 (see Figure 3 and Appendix Figure 4 ).
Insert Figure 3 : The top 1% income share in China and India, 1986-2001 Insert Figure 4 : The top 1% income share in China and India, 1986 These results can be used not only to evaluate the prospects for progressive income taxation in China and India (see Section 4 below), but also to shed some new light on the on-going debate about globalization and the rise in inequality. Although our data does not allow us to identify precisely the causal channels at work, and in particular to isolate the impact of globalization, we note that the fact that the rise in income inequality was so much concentrated within top incomes in both countries seems more consistent with a theory based on rents and market frictions (see e.g. Banerjee and Newman (2003) ) than with a theory based solely on skills and technological complementarity (i.e. inequality rises in the South because low-skill southern workers are too low-skill to benefit from globalization; see e.g. Kremer and Maskin (2003)), which would seem to imply more gradual shifts in the distribution. To the extent that the skill distribution is more unequal in India than in China (e.g. literacy rates are substantially higher in China), the skill-based theory would also seem to imply that income inequality should have risen more rapidly in India than in China, whereas we find the opposite (as far as the top 1% income share is concerned).
Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986-2010

Income Tax Schedules and Exemption Levels
We now come to the issue of progressive income taxation. Table 1 describes the evolution of Chinese income tax schedules during the 1980-2004 period. 13 In the prereform era, all workers worked for the state and paid an implicit tax from their wages.
Expansion of the private sector by the market reforms decreased the government's ability to tax directly. Following other countries, China developed an individual income taxation system, which officially began in 1980. In order to avoid negative public opinion, the deductible amount was set so high such that virtually no one had to pay income taxes in 1980.
However the striking fact is that China's income tax law has remained basically unchanged in nominal terms since its creation in 1980. The only major change is that the nominal exemption threshold for wage earners has been raised from 9 600 yuans per year in fiscal years 1980-1998 to 12 000 yuans in 1999-2003 and 14 400 yuans since 2004. Also note that the Chinese income tax systems treats wage income in a much more favourable manner than business income and capital income: while wage-earners are subject to the progressive income tax only if their annual wage is large enough, all business and capital income earners are subject to the tax (with no exemption). Business income is taxed by applying graded progressive rates, while capital income is taxed at a flat 20% rate. Many Western countries had a similar system when they first introduced income taxation (i.e. varying rates and deductions for different sources of income, with general a large exemption for wages and little or no exemption for business and capital income), before gradually shifting to a more integrated system. 14 13 Keeping track of all the changes in China's tax law is not an easy business, so unfortunately we cannot exclude the possibility that we missed some important changes. However to the best of our knowledge all parameters reported on Table 1 are accurate. Tax laws are enacted jointly by the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Some local tax regulations may be formulated at the provincial level. However, individual income tax brackets are set by the central government and it is illegal for regional governments to alter it although in fact, some rapidly growing cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen have on occasion increased the threshold above the centrally threshold to alleviate the tax burden of its lower income citizens.
Insert Table 1 : Progressive Income Tax Schedules in China, 1980 China, -2004 In contrast to the Chinese income tax, the Indian income tax is a much older institution, since it was created in 1922 by the British. Moreover, it has always been an integrated system treating all income sources equally: Indian progressive tax schedules apply to total individual income, irrespective of where the income comes from. Another important difference is that the tax schedule has been changed almost constantly in India during the 1986-2004 period, resulting into a general decline in tax rates and a continuous increase in the exemption threshold (see Table 2 ).
Insert Table 2 : Progressive Income Tax Schedules in India, 1986 India, -2004 From our perspective, the first important implication of these differing evolutions is that the exemption threshold (for wage earners) has increased less than inflation (and much less than nominal incomes) in China since 1986, while it increased approximately at the same rate as inflation in India, resulting into a massive increase in the proportion of the population subject to the income tax in China and a more modest increase in India (see Figures 5, 6 and 7) . In China, the exemption threshold in 1986 (9 600 yuans) was about 7 times larger than average individual urban income
(1 394 yuans), so that less than 0,1% of all wage earners were subject to the income tax in 1986. By 2003, the exemption threshold (12 000 yuans) has passed below average individual urban income (13 383 yuans), so that according to our estimates 44,1% of all urban wage earners were subject to tax. In India, the exemption threshold has always been set around 2-3 times average income during the 1986-2001 period, and it is only because of the rise in top income shares that the proportion of the population subject to the income tax has increased somewhat during this period (from 0,7% in 1986 to 3,8% in 2001). This is an important rise from an historical perspective (the proportion of the population subject to the Indian income tax had been relatively stable around 0,5%-1% between the 1920s and the early 1990s), but this is clearly much less than in China.
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In other words, due to lower bracket indexation and higher real income growth, the Chinese income tax has become a mass tax during the 1990s, while it has remained an elite tax in India. Assuming that China 
Income Tax Revenues
One important question, however, is whether the Chinese income tax law is really being applied in practice. I.e. do all individuals who are supposed to be subject to the income tax according to the law really pay the income tax? Chinese tax laws are reasonably well documented, but there is almost no documentation of the actual implementation of these laws. Many observers in and outside China seem to believe that tax authorities make deals with large firms and autonomous regions or cities whereby the latter offer a lump-sum payment to tax authorities and their employees and residents are not subject to the official income tax schedule. We conducted a series of interviews with managers of six firms in Shanghai and several former employees of local tax ministries from another large city. We interviewed 2 large public sector firms (4 000-10 000 employees), 2 middle size private sector firms (a non-Chinese firm and a Chinese firm, 200-500 employees), and 2 small private sector Chinese firms (30-100). According to these firms, the amount of income tax deducted from salaries is determined by the tax bureau that sends a representative to the firm once every couple of years. The duration is not set or announced ex ante.
However, all the firms we met with had been visited by the tax bureau in the past three years. The visit entails an examination of the employment records and salaries.
It is unclear whether the tax bureau determines an average tax rate for the firm on the basis of average wage only, or whether the full progressive schedule is really being applied . In many cases, all employees within a firm seem to share the same proportional tax liability. In other words, income taxation often seems to be progressive across firms, but not within firms. and theoretical tax revenues is given on Table 3 . The theoretical tax revenues were 16 Estimates according to which there were approximately 10-11 millions income tax taxpayers in China in 1997-1998 have been published in the China Tax Yearbooks, but we were unable to find out what these numbers exactly refer to and how they were constructed. If they were true, these numbers would be substantially smaller than our theoretical estimates (about 25% of 200 millions wage-earners subject to income tax in 1997-1998, i.e. approximately 50 million taxpayers; see appendix Tables A2  and A6 ), which would seem to suggest that the law is not being applied properly. However the missing taxpayers might well have very low average tax liabilities, so it is hard to know how these figures should be interpreted (if the Chinese tax authorities were able to produce reliable estimates of the total number of taxpayers, they should also be able to break down this total number by income bracket or tax liability). 17 « Other income » includes small items such as « author's remuneration » and « property transferring income » (these income types are not properly recorded in income surveys, and we did not attempt to replicate the corresponding tax revenues).
computed by applying the relevant tax schedules to the individual distributions of wage income, business income and capital income estimated from urban household income survey tabulations.
Insert Table 3 : Simulated vs. Actual Income Tax Revenues in China, 1996 China, -2003 The first conclusion emerging from Table 3 is that actual income tax revenues are reasonably in line with theoretical tax revenues (as a first-order approximation), thereby suggesting that income tax collection in China is somewhat less chaotic and arbitrary than what many observers tend to assume. In 1996, actual income tax receipts made 0,28% of GDP, and theoretical receipts 0,33% of GDP; in 2003, actual income tax receipts made 1,21% of GDP, and theoretical receipts 1,13% of GDP (cf. Table 3 ). If we look separately at receipts by income source for 2003, we find theoretical receipts on capital income were equal to 40% of actual receipts (this reflects the fact capital income is under-reported in surveys), and that the corresponding figure was over 120% for business income and wage income. The latter figure could be interpreted as saying that business income and wage income have an excellent reporting rate in household surveys, and that the tax law is reasonably well applied: almost all business income earners and wage earners who are supposed to pay the income tax do pay it and are charged the right rate.
Such an interpretation might be misleading, however. There are good reasons to believe that top business incomes and top wages are under-reported in NSB household surveys, in which case the fact that theoretical receipts (based upon under-reported top business incomes and wages) and actual receipts coincide merely reflects the fact that collection rate is much less than 100%. If we adjust top survey wages and business incomes so as to obtain reasonable Pareto coefficients for the distribution, 18 we find that theoretical receipts for wage and business income are equal to 170%-180% of actual receipts (see Table 3 ), i.e. the tax collection rate for wage and business income is less than 60%. Although the problem is probably less severe than what many observers tend to assume, these illustrative (and highly 18 In order to obtain Pareto coefficients in line with what we observe in the most egalitarian Western countries, NSB coefficients (and therefore top decile wages and business income) need to be raised by about 20%: the Pareto coefficient is around 1,4 in Chinese survey tabulations in the early 2000s, while it is at least in 1,6-1,7 in Western countries. This is of course purely illustrative, as we have no reason to believe that the true Chinese Pareto coefficient is the same as in the West.
uncertain) computations suggest that there does exist a tax collection problem in China.
It is also interesting to note that actual receipts have increased at a significantly higher rate than theoretical receipts during the 1996-2001 period. One interpretation could be that tax collection has improved. Another interpretation is that household surveys underestimate not only the levels of top incomes, but also the upward trend in top income shares. In order to get a sense of the likely magnitude of this effect, we computed by how much the upward trend in top income shares needs to be scaled up in order to ensure that the trend in theoretical receipts does match the trend in actual receipts. We find that the 2001 top 1% share should be scaled up by about 35% relatively to the top 1% share in 1996, which is substantial.
Insert Figure 9 : : Simulated vs. Actual Income Tax Revenues in China, 1996 China, -2003 Although there is some uncertainty about the quality of tax collection and survey data, actual and theoretical tax receipts both show that income tax receipts (as a fraction of GDP) have increased substantially during the 1990s and 2000s. The contrast with India is particularly striking: while Indian income tax revenues have stagnated around 0,5%-0,6% of GDP during the 1990s, Chinese income tax revenues have been multiplied by more than 10, from less than 0,1% of GDP in the early 1990s to over 1,2% of GDP in 2003 (see Figure 10 ). The stagnation of Indian tax revenues reflects the fact that tax rates have been continuously reduced (see Table 2 ) and that the proportion of individuals subject to tax has increased only modestly (see Figure 7) . The substantial rise in Chinese tax revenues reflects the facts that tax rates have remained the same (see Table 1 ) and that the proportion of individuals subject to tax has increased enormously (see Figure 7 ).
Insert Figure 10 : Income tax revenues as a fraction of GDP in China and India, 1986-2001 Note that Chinese tax revenues would be substantially larger in the absence of a preferential tax treatment given to top wage earners over top business and capital income earners. We computed that if the business income tax schedule was applied to wage income as well, then Chinese income tax revenues in 2001 would be more than 3% of GDP (instead of 1%). Although this preferential tax treatment of wage income might raise serious political problems in the medium run (as independent workers feel more and more disadvantaged as compared to top wage earners in large firms), as it did in other countries where similar preferential tax treatment was applied, removing this legal provision is however unnecessary to ensure the growth of Chinese income tax revenues. Because of the phenomenal growth in average incomes (and even more so of top incomes), income tax revenues should make much more than 1% of GDP in 2010. According to our projections, which are based on the assumption that tax law will not be changed after 2004 and that income trends will remain the same as in the 1996-2003 period, income tax revenues in China should make about 4,1% in GDP by 2010 (see Figure 11 ).
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The assumption that the exemption threshold will not be raised in the short run does not seem unreasonable, given that the 2004 increase in the exemption threshold was fairly high (from 12 000 to 14 400 yuans, i.e. 20%) and that inflation is currently very close to 0%. Moreover our projected tax revenues estimates should be viewed as a lower bound, first because we assumed that the survey-based trends and levels in top shares were not under-estimated (in particular we did not make the adjustment reported on Figure 9 ), and next because we assumed that there would be no improvement in tax collection. In other words, there are good reasons to believe that the income tax will raise at least 4% of GDP in China by 2010.
Insert Figure 11 : Projected income tax revenues (as a fraction of GDP) in China, 1986 China, -2010 If this happens, then China will have gone through its fiscal revolution. As Table 4 illustrates, moving from an elite income tax raising less than 1% of GDP to a mass income tax raising around 4-5% of GDP is exactly the kind of process through which Western countries have gone during the 1914-1950 period (when their income levels were similar to current Chinese levels). Although Indian income tax revenues will probably increase during the coming years, the prospects for India look less good, both because of lower income growth and higher bracket indexation. One reason why India faces more difficulties than China in making its income tax a mass tax might also be that the proportion of formal wage earners in the labor force is ridiculously low in India.
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Insert Table 4 : Income tax development in historical perspective
Finally, note that according to our projections Chinese income tax revenues will exceed 10% of GDP by 2015, with over 85% of the urban workforce paying the income tax. This is again assuming fixed income trends, and most importantly no nominal change in income tax schedules until 2015, which seems very unlikely over such a long time period. As the income tax becomes larger and starts hitting the majority of the population, it is likely that the Chinese authorities will need to start adjusting exemption thresholds and tax brackets in line with inflation and real growth.
Concluding comments
One might be tempted to conclude from this paper that the high growth performance of the Chinese economy is going to solve every problem, including the fiscal modernization problem, and that there is nothing else to worry about. We indeed found that due to high income growth and low bracket indexation, income tax revenues are currently booming in China, and that they should exceed 4% of GDP by 2010 (assuming constant tax law and income trends). The prospects look much less promising in India, where the income tax will probably will probably remain an elite tax (rather than a mass tax) in the coming years.
The main conclusion that we draw from this paper, however, is that there is a lot policy makers and economists can do in order to improve the functioning and implications of progressive income taxation in countries like China and India. Given that income taxation is about to become something big, it is urgent to put income tax reform at the top of the policy agenda. For instance, China will not be able to underindex its exemption threshold forever, and the preferential tax treatment of wage earners will need to be addressed at some point. Next, there is clearly a problem with income tax collection in China (although our estimates suggest that it is less massive 20 See e.g. Tendulkar (2003) .
than what it sometimes assumed). At the very least, China's tax authorities should start compiling and publishing detailed income tax tabulations by income bracket and tax liability (which every other country in the world with an income tax actually does), so that the tax collection problem can be properly evaluated and addressed. 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source: Authors' computations using national accounts (see Table A0 , col. 29% 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Source: Authors' computations using urban household surveys tabulations ( Source: Actual tax receipts from China Tax Yearbook; Simulated tax receipts were computed by applying income tax schedules to household survey income data (see Table 3 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source: China: 1996-2001: actual tax receipts from China Tax Yearbook (see Table 3 ); 1986-1995: adjusted simulated tax receipts (see Table A6 
M. Ravallion and S. Chen, "When Economic Reform is Faster than
Marginal tax rate
Note : China's income tax applies to individual income (not to household income). The business income schedule applies to "income from production and business operations derived by individual industrialists and merchants" and "income from contracted or leased operation of enterprises and institutions". Most forms of transfer income are exempt from the income tax. Capital income (interest, dividends, royalties, rent, etc.) has always been taxed at a flat 20% rate (with no allowance), although there are some exemptions (interest income on saving deposits and national debt is exempt from income tax). Agricultural income is excluded from the income tax (peasants are subject to a separate, indirect income tax based on average yields). The exemption thresholds for wage earners reported on this table (9600 yuans in 1980-1998, 12000 yuans in 1999-2003, and 14400 yuans since 2004 ) are those applied in Beijing. The thresholds applied in other regions can be slightly different (e.g. in Shanghai the threshold was 9600 yuans until 1993, 12000 yuans in 1994-1998, and 14400 yuans since 1999). 1986-1988 1989-1990 Brackets of annual income (Rs) 1991 1992-1993 Brackets of annual income (Rs)
Note : India's income tax applies to individual income, not to household income (except for Hindu Undivided Families). The general principle is that all income sources are subject to the same tax rates (the progressive tax schedule applies to the sum of all individual incomes, whatever the source). There are however special exemptions for particular forms of interest income, transfer income, etc. The tax schedules reported on this table do not include "temporary" tax surcharges (for instance, a 10% tax surcharge has been applied to all incomes above 60000 Rs since 2000, so that the effective top rate is 33% rather than 30%).
1996-1997 1998
Brackets of annual income (Rs) Source : National accounts and tax statistics. U.S.: see Piketty and Saez (2003) . France: see Piketty (2003) . China: see this paper (total tax revenues come from China Statistical Yearbook and China Tax Yearbook). India: see Banerjee and Piketty (2003) (total tax revenues come from WDI data base). (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Note: The samples used by NSB urban household surveys are designed so as to be representative of urban China (iwth approximately uniform sampling rates). The implicit sampling rate was computed by using the demographic data reported on Table A0 . E.g. 3,8 x 12437 = 47261 individuals (with or without positive income, including children) are covered by the 1986 survey, and total urban population of China was equal to 24,5% x 1075 millions = 264 millions in 1986, hence a sampling rate equal to (1/..) 264 millions/47261 = 5579. Note that total income reported in household-level distributions is always 30-40% larger than total income reported in individual-level distributions (e.g., in 1986, 5579 x 12437 x 3523 = 244 billions yuans, while 5579 x 23584 x 1394 = 183 billions yuans; see Table A2 ). This is due to the fact that some forms of income cannot be attributed to a specific individual within the household (this is particularly true for transfer and property income; in 1986-1987, only wage income was individualized). The urban per capita income series reported on Table A0 was computed using household-level data (e.g., in 1986, 3523/3.8 = 927) and coïncide with the urban per capita income series published in China Statistical Yearbook. Note: The total income aggregates reported on this table were computed using the series on sampling rates, number of observations, average income and income composition by source reported on Table A1 (see example in the note to Table A1 ). The numbers of wage earners and business income earners reported on this table were computed by dividing the relevant total income aggregate (household tabulation) by average individual income (average wage by wage earner and average business income by business income earner are approximately equal to average individual income by positive income earner, due to the fact that income composition shares do not vary very much by income bracket: business income is somewhat more prevalent both in low income brackets and high income brackets, and both effects approximately cancel out; for simplicity we assume strict equality). E.g., for 1986, 203,3 billions/1394 = 145,8 millions wage earners. Tables A2 and A3 and on income tax schedules reported on Table 1 . Adjusted simulations results (col. (14) and (15)) were computed in the following way: for 1996-2001, adjusted simulation results are equal to actual receipts reported on Table 3 ; for 1986-1996, adjusted simulation results were obtained by upscaling each income source rax simulation by the same adjusted/raw ratios as for 1996; for 2002-2010, adjusted simulation results were obtained by upscaling each income source rax simulation by the same adjusted/raw ratios as for 2001.
Effective average tax rates
Wage earners Business income earners P0-100 P90-100 P99-100 P0-100
Total receipts
Adjusted simulations: Total receipts
